Four experiments involving 123 university students tested directionality effects in the comprehension of spatial relations, quantified statements, and propositional connectives with a sentence-picture verification task. Presentation of the referents of terms in the statements was separated by 1 s, and presentation order was congruent or incongruent with the order of terms in the statement. Some relations showed faster verification times for congruent display order, others for incongruent display order, and still others showed no directionality effect. The authors proposed a 2-step process model for the construction of semantic representations of relational statements, in which a reference object is established f'trst, and then the second object is attached in relation to it. This theory explains the various directionality effects as a general preference to process information about the reference object before information about the target object.
fight of the soap." Our leading hypothesis is that many of these relational premises pragmatically imply an asymmetry of the two arguments, which leads to a preferred direction of processing the two terms in a premise. This, we assume, is reflected in effects of directionality observable in deductive reasoning tasks: Changing the order of terms within premises, as well as changing the order of premises themselves, often affects the outcome of the reasoning process even if it does not change what can be logically deduced from the premises. In what follows, we first develop our hypothesis about the directionality of single premises, which is the focus of the present article, and then briefly discuss the existing evidence for directionality effects in deductive inferences.
The Directionality of Relational Premises
When comprehending a premise such as "The church is on the left of the train station," the person must form a representation of the meaning conveyed by the sentence. This representation should contain the information about the spatial relation between the church and the train station. The statement, however, does not only convey information about the content of a representation the person should build but also provides an instruction how to construct this representation within the context of his or her knowledge. Put in more explicit terms, this instruction could be worded as, for example: "Imagine you are standing in front of the train station, facing the main entrance. Turn your mind's eye to the left, there you will see the church." The same spatial relation could be expressed as "The train station is on the fight of the church." This sentence, however, implies a different instruction for knowledge updating. If someone knows where the train station is but asks for the location of the church, then the first sentence is a pragmatically appropriate answer, but the second is not. Logan (1994) developed a processing model for the construction of spatial representations from verbal statements that incorporates the asymmetric role of the two arguments. The core assumption of his theory is that every statement about a spatial relation, R(A,B), implicitly designates one argument as a target object and the other as a reference object. The reference object is used to locate and orient a reference frame within a mental coordinate system. The meaning of the relational term then defines a region of acceptability relative to the reference frame in which the target object may be placed to fulfill the truth conditions of the statement. For example, when the cognitive system receives the statement "The tree is on the left of the house," it would first identify the house as the reference object and place it somewhere in the spatial coordinate system. The relation "on the left of' is interpreted as a region on the left of the reference object, and the focus of attention is moved from the reference object into this region to detect (in case of search or verification tasks) or to construct (e.g., in imagery tasks) a representation of the tree.
Generalizing this processing model, we assume that the meaning of relational expressions is in part represented as a set of cognitive procedures for building a representation of the situation described by a statement. These procedures start with establishing the referent of one term as a reference object that serves as the foundation of a new structure, and then proceed to add a representation of the other term as a target object in the required relation to the reference object (see Gernsbacher, 1991) . This establishes an inherent directionality in the resulting representation, such that reasoning processes tend to start with the reference object and proceed to the target object, rather than the reverse.
A summary of our hypotheses about the inherent directionality in relational premises of common deductive reasoning tasks is given in Table 1 . The expectations for the directionality of specific relations are based on a semantic analysis of the relations within the framework introduced here; the detailed reasons for our prediction concerning each relation are given in the context of the experiments that test them.
The overview shows that the relations involved in some premises of deduction tasks are expected to invoke directionality from the first to the second term, while others should have directionality 
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p< --~q p<--~q from the second to the first term, and still others are supposed to have no directionality at all. If the representation of a single premise's meaning has an inherent asymmetry, then this is likely to affect the integration of two or more premises in reasoning as well. In the following section, we discuss observations from experiments on deductive reasoning that can be interpreted as manifestations of the inherent directionality of the premises.
Evidence for Directionality in Reasoning
Evidence for directionality effects in deduction comes mainly from the well-documented figural effects in syllogistic reasoning (Bara, Bucciarelli, & Johnson-Laird, 1995; Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Johnson-Laird & Steedman, 1978) . The figure of a syllogism refers to the arrangement of the three terms A, B, and C, interrelated by the premises. For example, given the two premises "All the taxi drivers (A) are home owners (B)" and "None of the home owners (B) is a football fan (C)," people draw the conclusion from A to C, "No taxi drivers are football fans," more readily than the equally valid conclusion from C to A, "None of the football fans is a taxi driver." Four figures are distinguished: A-B/B-C, B-A/C-B, A-B/C-B, and B-A/B-C. The figure of a syllogism has an effect on the direction of spontaneous conclusions. People prefer A-C conclusions to the first figure but prefer C-A conclusions to the second; a slight tendency in favor of A-C conclusions is observed for the remaining two figures. Additionally, people's ability to draw a valid conclusion from a syllogism, if there is one, depends on the figure. The syllogism's difficulty increases monotonically from the first to the fourth figure. Bauer and Johnson-Laird (1993) found a similar figural effect with disjunctive premises.
An effect of directionality for conditional reasoning tasks was observed by  for related findings, see also Evans & Beck, 1981; Evans & Newstead, 1977) . From a review of several studies, Evans concluded that people preferred the "forward" conclusions modus ponens (MP) and denial of the antecedent (DA) when the conditional premise is formulated as "ifp then q." When the premise is formulated "p only if q," the "backward" conclusions modus to/lens (MT) and acceptance of the consequence (AC) are drawn more frequently.1
Further evidence for directionality is provided by a series of experiments by De Vooght and Vandierendonck (1998) . They argued that a premise such as "A is on the left of B" will be interpreted by using B as a reference point, in line with the theory of Logan (1994) . A second premise "C is on the right of B" will then be easy to integrate with the first, because the same reference object as before can be used. A second premise of the form "A is on the fight of C," in contrast, requires that a new reference object be established. De Vooght and Vandierendonck showed that selfpaced reading times for premises in spatial reasoning tasks increased when a change of reference object was needed.
1 There are four standard inferences from a conditional statement as major premise together with four different minor premises. The conditional if p then q combined with p leads to the valid conclusion q by MP. Combined with the minor premise not q, MT yields not p as a valid conclusion. People frequently draw the invalid conclusions DA, that is, inferring not q from the minor premise not p, and AC, that is, inferring p when q is given as minor premise.
We hypothesize that directionality effects in reasoning can be explained at least in part by the inherent directionality of the premises involved. For example, if we are right assuming a directionality from the first to the second term in quantified statements (see Table 1 ), then it seems only natural that a syllogism of the form "Some A are B, some B are C" will more likely yield the (invalid, but frequent) conclusion "Some A are C" than the converse "Some C are A." The first conclusion preserves the directionality of the premises, whereas the second does not. This is not to say that no other factors are at work in producing effects of figure (cf. Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984; Polk & Newell, 1995; Stennlng & Yule, 1997; Wetherick & Gilhooly, 1990) . But if relational premises have an inherent directionality, we can expect that it will have consequences for the outcome of reasoning processes that look similar to what is observed as figural effects or effects of premise order in some domains of reasoning research.
The purpose of the present experiments is to provide evidence for the pervasiveness of directionality in single relational premises, as well as to test the hypothesis that there is a general preference for processing the reference object before the target object for premises from various domains of deductive reasoning. Experiment 1 tests spatial relations, Experiment 2 tests quantifiers, and Experiments 3a and 3b focus on propositional relations.
Experiment 1
All experiments reported in this article are variants of a sentence-picture verification paradigm, which follow the same basic design. Each trial of the task began with presentation of a written statement expressing a relation between two terms. The term mentioned first in the sentence is called p, and the term mentioned second is called q. The sentence is followed by a picture of one instance (Experiment 1) or three instances (Experiments 2 and 3) of a relation between the p term and the q term; that is, each instance was a combination of either p or not-p with either q or not-q. Participants had to decide quickly whether the relation expressed in the statement was true for the picture. Display of the p elements and the q elements in the picture was separated by a delay of 1,000 ms, and order of display was the main independent variable. The picture sequence p-q is called congruent, because it matches the order of terms in the sentence; the q-p order is called incongruent. We assumed that the comparison of a semantic representation of the sentence with a picture is done easier and faster when it can start with the reference object. Verification will then proceed faster if the presentation order matches the directionality of the representation. Thus, for relations with directionality from p to q, we expected shorter reaction times to congruent than to incongruent displays. For relations with directionality from q to p, we expected the reverse pattern.
Experiment 1 used the spatial relations "left," "right," "included in," and "includes." We already discussed the directionality inherent in statements of the form "A is on the left/right of B" earlier. According to our framework, the construction of a semantic representation for these statements should start with the second term as a reference object. The incongruent display order should therefore be processed faster, because the reference object is presented first in the picture.
The two relations of containment provide an interesting contrast to the left-right relations. A statement such as "The triangle is contained in the circle" can be analyzed like a left-right statement, in that the second term forms the reference object for the first one. The hearer ought to know where the circle is in order to locate the triangle. Moreover, in the situation the sentence describes, the circle forms a natural perceptual reference frame for the triangle enclosed by it. The inverse relationship, "The triangle contains the circle," differs from the first one both syntactically (i.e., active vs. passive) and semantically (i.e., the triangle now is the larger object that forms a perceptual reference frame for the one it contains). Both factors might contribute to a reversal of the directionality conveyed by the second sentence compared with the first: '~'lae triangle contains the circle" presupposes the triangle as already established in the bearer's discourse representation and adds the new information that within it there is the circle. Moreover, in a configuration of a circle within a triangle, the triangle is a likely perceptual reference frame for the circle. If this assumption turns out to be correct, it implies that the term designating the reference object in a relational statement is not bound to a noun phrase's syntactic role: The triangle is the grammatical subject in both containment statements. In sum, we expected shorter reaction times to incongruent displays for the left-right relations and "is contained in," whereas the "contains" sentences should yield shorter reaction times to congruent displays (see Table 1 ).
Our predictions differ from the assumptions of Greenspan and Segal (1984) about processing preferences in sentence-picture verification tasks. Greenspan and Segal proposed a topiccomment strategy of comparing a statement with an accompanying picture. The topic of a sentence is the noun phrase the sentence is about; the comment expresses what is said about the topic. Usually the first noun phrase of a sentence is the topic. In the case of spatial relations such as "The star is above the cross," "the star" refers to the topic, and "is above the cross" expresses the comment. According to Greenspan and Segai, people compare sentences to pictures by first locating the referent of topic in the picture and then looking for the object mentioned in the comment. Applied to the spatial relations used here, this would imply that people search the picture first for the p term, and only then look for the q term. Thus, the model of Greenspan and Segal should predict shorter reaction times to the congruent display sequence for all four spatial relations.
Method
Participants. Participants were students from the University of Mannheim, Mannheim, Germany; they received course credit or 10 deutsche marks (DM; about $7) for their participation. There were 29 participants in Experiment 1 (11 men and 18 women; mean age = 23.4 years, SD = 5.2).
Materials and procedure. Sixty-four sentence verification tasks were presented by computer. A trial began with the display of a sentence. The sentence described the spatial relation of two geometrical figures. There were four relations: (a) "The triangle is on the left of the circle," (b) 'q'he triangle is on the right of the circle," (c) "The triangle is contained in the circle," and (d) "The triangle contains the circle." There were five geometrical figures (circle, triangle, square, cross, and semicircle) that were randomly allocated to the two terms in each trial, with the restriction that two different figures are used for the two terms.
Participants were instructed to read the sentence until they had completely understood its meaning; they were to take as much time as necessary for this. Then they pressed the space bar, the sentence disappeared, and the picture appeared. The first part of the display always was a single geometrical form of medium size centered on the screen. One second later, a second figure appeared. If the relation was "left" or "fight," the second figure was of medium size and placed on the left or the fight of the central one. In case of the containment relations, the second figure was of small or large size and displayed centrally, so that it either contained the first figure or was contained in it. Participants were required to decide as quickly as possible whether the sentence shown before was ~'ue or false for the state of affairs in the picture and to indicate this by pressing a key labeled "yes"
Two factors were crossed in a within-subjects design: (a) relation, with the four spatial relations mentioned above, and (b) congruence between the order of terms in the sentence and their order of appearance in the picture. Half of the sentences in each condition were true, the other half were false with respect to the picture. Presentation order of items was randomized individually for each participant. Reading times for sentences and verification times were recorded as dependent variables.
Participants were tested in groups of up to 17 in the department computer pool. They received written instructions, which the experimenter read aloud at the beginning. Participants then worked through 12 practice trials before beginning with the test. The total procedure lasted about 40 rain.
Results
The hypotheses were tested on the basis of reaction times to the pictures, because the critical feature of the experimental paradigm, the relative delay of the two picture parts, should affect the latency of postulated cognitive processes during the verification phase but not necessarily their accuracy. Accuracy data were analyzed to test for a possible speed-accuracy tradeoff. To reduce skewness in the distributions, we transformed verification times logarithmically and applied arcsine transformations to the percentage of correct data. Latency results reported are based on verification times for correct responses only; overall error rate was 7%. An alpha level of .05 was applied to all statistical tests in this article.
A 4 × 2 analysis of variance (ANOVA) with relation (four spatial relations) and congruence as factors was conducted with the verification times. There was a significant main effect of relation, F(3, 84) = 3.57, MSE = 0.04. The main effect of congruence was only marginally significant, F(1, 28) = 3.26, MSE = 0.03, p = .08, but congruence interacted with relation, F(3, 84) = 7.15, MSE = 0.04. Figure 1 shows that the incongruent display order was responded to faster for the spatial relations "right of," "left of," and "is contained in," but the effect was reversed for "contains." When the relation "contains" was excluded from analysis, the effect of congruence became significant for the other three relations, F(1, 28) = 12.31, MSE = 0.04, and the interaction disappeared (F < 1). On the other hand, the congruence effect for "contains" alone was also significant, t(28) = 3.16. Accuracies paralleled latency data with insignificant main effects for relation and congruence but a reliable interaction, F(3, 84) = 2.96, MSE = 0.06. The incongruent condition yielded more correct responses for "right," "left," and "is contained in" but less correct responses for "contains." Speed and accuracy data, therefore, pointed in the same direction.
Discussion
The results of the f'n'st experiment were precisely as predicted by our distinction of target and reference object and by Logan's (1994) theory. In each case, verification latencies were shorter when the referent of the reference object was presented first. The findings are not supportive for the topic-comment strategy proposed by Greenspan and Segal (1984) . Greenspan and Segal (1984) supported their theory by a series of experiments with sentence-picture verification tasks. They organized successive trials into pairs and showed that when the topic of the first sentence (i.e., its subject noun phrase) was repeated in the immediately following trial, and its referent in the picture was at the same location, the latency for the second trial was reduced. This effect was not observed consistently in the same way for repetition of the object noun phrase. In our view, these results demonstrate that the topic has a special status in the sentencepicture comparison process, but they do not prove that the referent of the topic is processed first. For example, as Greenspan and Segal (1984, p . 600) themselves argued, linguistic conventions could have guided the system to reuse information about the topic in successive trials but not information about the comment. This is fully compatible with the idea that, within each trial, the object referred to in the comment is processed first and the referent of the topic second, as our account predicts for three of the spatial relations investigated here.
In sum, Experiment 1 shows that directionality effects can arise from the interpretation of single premises about spatial relations, that they can be identified with the sentence-picture verification paradigm used here, and that they follow the predictions of our processing theory. The next experiment extends the investigation to quantifiers.
Experiment 2
The second experiment tested directionality effects in the quanriflers "all," "some," "no," and "some ... not." These are the quantifiers from which the Aristotelian syllogisms are constructed. Because the clearest evidence for directionality effects in deductive reasoning until now consists of the figural effects with syllogisms, it is important to investigate the inherent directionality of quantified premises involved in these tasks.
Quantified statements such as "Some taxi drivers are home owners" can be interpreted as instructions to modify the representation of a set of entities expressed by p according to the predicate expressed by "are q." In the example, the hearer is instructed to update his or her knowledge about taxi drivers by adding the fact that some of them are home owners. It is not a sentence one would usually expect when the speaker wants to inform about home owners, in which case it would be more natural to say the same thing in the form "Some home owners are taxi drivers." This analysis implies that the p term in a quantified statement refers to the set of objects that are used as reference objects in the construction of a representation for the statement. The q term refers to another set of objects, some of which are identified with the p objects, or to attributes linked to some of the p objects.
The reference-target structure is most obvious in quantified statements that use attributes instead of noun phrases as q terms, for example, "Some taxi drivers are drunk." It is straightforward to form a representation of a set of taxi drivers and then add the feature "drunk" to a subset of them. It is not so easy to start building a representation with the q term, because one cannot represent an attribute without linking it to an object. To do this, one needs a supplementary set of reference objects, for example, a set of people who are drunk. Therefore, a reversal of term order in a quantified statement with attributes makes it necessary to change the wording of the q term: "Some drunk people are taxi drivers."
We therefore assume that the first term in quantified premises is taken as the reference object in a representation, and the second term as the target object. Thus, the expected directionality runs from the first term (p) to the second term (q) for all four quantitiers. This should lead to a general advantage for congruent display orders.
An additional question concerned the interaction of directionality effects on two levels. The statements used in the present experiment expressed a quantified relation between geometrical figures and numbers contained in them, for example, "Some triangles contain a four." This should generate a directionality effect due to the quantifier on the level of the whole sentence and an independent effect of the directionality implied by the containment relation on the level of the individual objects. The two effects can work in the same direction, as in the example given above: "Triangles" is the p term of the quantified statement, which is the natural reference set, and the triangles are said to be the containers of the "four" symbols, so the spatial relation also suggests "triangles" as the reference object. But the two relations involved can also work in opposite direction when the order of geometrical forms and numbers in the sentence is reversed, as in "Some objects with a four are triangles." Here, "objects with a four" forms the p term, and hence the preferred reference set, for the quantified relation, which yields directionality from p to q, whereas the triangles mentioned in the q term are implied to contain the "four," inducing directionality from q to p.
Therefore, we expected, in addition to an advantage for congruent display orders, faster responses to displays in which the geometrical figure (i.e., the container) is presented before the number (i.e., the contained object), regardless of the roles figure and number played in the sentence. Because of the way we coded the experimental factors, this effect should appear as an interaction of congruence with sentence order: The general advantage of congruent over incongruent displays should be more pronounced when the sentence mentions the geometrical figure in the subject role and the number in the object role, such that a congruent display order presents the geometrical figure before the number.
Method
Participants. Thirty-one psychology students participated in Experiment 2. The mean age of the 24 women and 7 men was 23.2 years (SD = 7.6).
Materials and procedure. Experiment 2 used sentences with the four quantifiers from syllogistic logic, for example, "All triangles contain a four," "Some triangles contain a four," "No triangle contains a four," and "Some triangles do not contain a four." There was a counterpart for every kind of sentence, in which the number took the subject role and the geometrical figure took the predicate role, for example, "All objects with a four are triangles." The original German sentences were all made 12 to 14 syllables long by inserting filler words where necessary. The basic experimental design was the same as that of Experiment 1, with the exception that now each picture consisted of three geometrical objects in a row, each one containing a number. For example, there could be a triangle containing a four, a circle containing a three, and a square containing a four. In this way, it was possible to present adequate pictures for the sentences with quantifiers (e.g., to distinguish between pictures in which "All triangles contain a four" is true and pictures in which only "Some triangles contain a four" is true). Three factors were crossed in a within-subjects design: (a) quantifier, (b) order of terms in the sentence, with geometrical figure or number in the subject role, and (c) congruence between the order of terms in the sentence and their order of appearance in the picture. In the congruent display order, the referents of the p term were displayed before the referents of the q term; in the incongruent condition, the order was reversed.
Each trial began with the presentation of a sentence that expressed a relation between a kind of geometrical figure and a number it contained. After participants read the sentence and pressed a space bar, the sentence disappeared and a picture was displayed in two parts, separated by 1,000 ms. Depending on sentence order and congruence, the first part of the display presented only the figures and the second part added the numbers, or else the numbers were displayed first and the figures surrounding them followed one second later. In the complete picture, each figure contained a number between 1 and 5, represented by the respective arrangement of dots on a die. The geometrical figures could be the same or different within a picture, and they were taken from a set of five figures: triangle, circle, semicircle, square, and cross.
As a further independent variable, the number ofp objects in the picture, as opposed to not-p objects, was varied. Half of the 64 items had pictures with one p object and two not-p objects, and the other half had two p objects together with one not-p object. Eight additional items with three p objects and no not-p objects were constructed. The additional items all had the quantifier "all" and congruent display order because otherwise the sentence's truth value could already be determined on a partial picture alone. 2 The additional 8 items were constructed to control for a potential attentional artifact (see below). The order of all 74 items was determined at random for each participant. All quantifiers were explained by examples, and special care was taken to make explicit that two of them are not convertible, for example, "All p are q" does not mean "All q are p."
Results
Data were treated as in Experiment 1; 13% of reaction times were excluded from analysis because they were associated with erroneous responses. Data from 1 participant who had a mean latency larger than 10 s in one design cell and another participant who made so many errors (34% overall) that one design cell was empty were also eliminated. 3 Verification times were submitted to a 4 (quantifier) × 2 (congruence) × 2 (sentence order) ANOVA.
As predicted, verification was faster for congruent than for incongruent display order, F(1, 28) = 72.63, MSE = 0.04. The effect of congruence did not interact significantly with quantifier (F < 2). The sentence order figure-number generally yielded shorter reaction times than the number-figure order, F(1, 28) = 6.06, MSE = 0.07. More important, the effect of congruence interacted with sentence order, F(1, 28) = 15.06, MSE = 0.08. Figure 2 shows that congruence effects were weaker when sentence order placed number in the subject role. The pattern can also be described as a general advantage for displays in which the geometrical figures appeared first over those in which the numbers appeared first. Finally, there was also a main effect of quantifier. Verification times were longest for the negated quantifiers "no" and "some ... not" and shortest for "all," F(3, 84) = 21.37, MSE = 0.12.
A parallel analysis of accuracy data yielded only a significant effect of quantifier, F(1, 28) = 8.22, MSE = 0.22, with "some" being the easiest and "some... not" the hardest logical expression and the other two quantifiers in between. The effects of congruence and sentence form, which are of primary interest in the present context, were not compromised by speed-accuracy tradeoff.
Test of an Attentional Strategy
A further analysis was conducted to rule out one potential objection to the interpretation of directionality effects in the present experiment. It could be that, in the case of nonconvertible quantifiers (most notably "all"), a strategic advantage for visual search can be gained when the p part of the picture appears first. In this case one could reduce the search space by focusing only on thep objects, because the not-p objects are known to be irrelevant. This could make processing of the congruent displays faster. In the incongruent display order, when the q part of the picture appears first, one could, from a logical point of view, focus exclusively on the not-q elements, because the q elements are irrelevant. But we know from work with the Wason selection task (reviewed in Evans, Newstead, & Byrue, 1993) relevance of not-q and the irrelevance of q for the evaluation of conditionals as well as statements with the quantifier "all," so they cannot be expected to engage in selective attention when the q part appears fu'st. The same argument can be applied to the nonconvertible conditionals investigated in Experiments 3a and 3b (see later). We think it unlikely that this selective attention can account for the present data completely, because no advantage of selective attention can be gained for the spatial relations used in Experiment 1 and for the nonconvertible quantifiers. Nonetheless, we planned to test the selective attention hypothesis by including an extra set of trials in which all three objects in the first part of the picture were p elements and none was a not-p dement (e.g., for a sentence such as "All triangles contain a four," the first part of the picture presented three triangles and no other geometrical figure) . If the directionality effects were due exclusively to a selective attention strategy, they should disappear in trials with three p elements, because selective attention to the p elements does nothing to narrow down the set of relevant objects in this case.
A 2 (congruence) × 2 (sentence form) ANOVA was performed on reaction time data for the quantifier "all." The eight additional items with three p elements represented the congruent condition and were compared with items with one or two p elements in the incongruent condition. If we assume that congruence effects arise only from a focusing strategy, then they should disappear in this analysis. The focusing strategy provides an advantage only when display order is congruent and there are less than three elements where p is true. By selecting items with three p elements for the congruent condition, we eliminate eventual gains from a focusing strategy. The congruence effect was still strong in this comparison, F(1, 28) = 30.69, MSE = 0.05. We conclude that a focusing strategy is at least not the only reason for the directionality effects observed in our experiments.
Discussion
Directionality effects from the subject term to the object term were observed for all four quantifiers. Furthermore, the effects of congruence consistently interacted with sentence order. Thus, the present experiment provides evidence for the directionality effects predicted by our framework. Directionality effects were present on two levels simultaneously; they arose from the containment relation of geometrical figure and number on the level of individual objects and from the quantified set relations.
It is particularly important that directionality effects were also observed for the convertible quantifiers "some" and "no." This implies that the effect is not a byproduct of the different logical roles of the two terms. For nonconvertible quantifiers, as well as for the conditionals investigated below in Experiments 3a and 3b, one could argue that the directionality effects observed here just followed the direction of inferences licensed by the premises. For example, "All apples are sweet" instructs the hearer to infer sweetness whenever she sees an apple but not to infer that an apple must be around whenever she tastes something sweet. In these a We did not generally truncate outliers because simulations by Ulrich and Miller (1994) showed that this can do more damage to the data than the outliers themselves. cases, the expected directionality of the statements is necessarily confounded with its logical meaning. This is not the case with convertible quantifiers, that is, quantifiers for which statements with term order A-B and B-A are logically equivalent. "No piano player is a clown" and "No clown is a piano player" are logically equivalent, but they differ with respect to which term is presupposed as given and which is new. (The same argument holds for the spatial relations investigated in Experiment 1.) It is the structure of reference and target object induced by a relation, not the logical meaning, that drives the directionality effects observed in the present experiment.
Experiments 3a and 3b
The last two experiments in the present series extend our account to propositional connectives, that is, several variants of conditionals and disjunctions. Conditionals can be analyzed according to the contrast of reference situations and target situations. (We speak of situations instead of objects here, because the terms in propositional logic refer to states of affair, not to individual objects.) A standard conditional such as "If the wind stops, then it will rain" invites the hearer to assume the antecedent ("If the wind stops") as a supposition. The role of the antecedent as a supposition is incorporated in semantic analyses of the meaning of conditionals (e.g., Stalnaker, 1991) as well as in psychological theories of deductive reasoning (e.g., Braine & O'Brien, 1991) . The antecedent is interpreted as the reference frame, relative to which the consequent term is interpreted. The hearer is asked to take the antecedent as if it were the case (at least for the sake of the argument) and to think of the consequent as something that is true within the framework established by the antecedent.
As in the case of spatial inclusion, conditionals can be expressed in two ways with opposite order of terms: either in the standard form "if p then q" or in the reversed form "p if q." The reversed form was used from time to time in experiments on conditional reasoning, and the evidence suggests that "p if q" is understood fairly equivalently to "if q then p" (Evans, Clibbens, & Rood, 1995; Ormerod, Manktelow, & Jones, 1993) . A contrast of the two forms allows us to disentangle the reference-target structure from the effect of term order in conditional statements, because the terms p and q are mentioned in the same order in both forms, but the role of antecedent and consequent is reversed. The order of terms, and not their semantic role, should be the critical factor if directionality effects arise from something like a "first-in-first-out" mechanism of working memory (e.g., Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) .
Biconditional statements offer two interpretations that differ with respect to the resulting directionality. We assume that statements of the form "if and only if p, then q" are decomposed into two standard conditionals. The first variant can be phrased as "ifp then q, and if not p then not q." This results in strong directionality from the p term to the q term. The second variant is "ifp then q, and if q then p." If interpreted in this way, the biconditional is interpreted by processes working in opposite directions, so that the effects of directionality cancel each other.
Sometimes standard conditionals of the form "if p, then q" are contrasted with the logically equivalent formulation "p only if q." In this case, the q term is the antecedent marked by "if" and the p term is the consequent. Different from standard conditionals, however, "only if" statements do not ask the hearer to take the antecedent q as a supposition. Rather, q is said to be a necessary prerequisite for the truth of p. Such a statement makes pragmatic sense in the context of a discourse in which p is at issue, either as something that is the case (e.g. "The alarm light went on. The alarm light goes on only when the valve is broken.") or as something that is considered (e.g. "I wish I could travel to Vega. You can do that only if you can travel faster than light."). Statements with "only if" presuppose that the consequent term p is already part of the knowledge and/or the discourse representation of the hearer, and they can be used to guide the hearer from thinking of p to consideration of the prerequisite q. On the other hand, an "only if" statement, like any conditional, invites an inference from the antecedent to the consequent term. In fact, we are licensed to infer from "not q" that p must also be false (an MT inference). To reconcile these two observations, we propose that "only if" statements imply an instruction for a two-step procedure. The first step starts with establishing the p term as reference situation, taking the role of a supposition. Then the hearer tries to form a representation of q being true, because q was stated to be a necessary prerequisite for p. If this succeeds, the process stops there, but if it fails, it returns to the representation of p and negates it (i.e., infers that p is false). If we wish to make the instruction for interpreting "p only if q" explicit, it could be verbalized as follows: "First, suppose p is the case and establish a representation of it. Check if the prerequisite q is also the case. If you find out it is not, the second step is to go back to the representation of p and delete it." (Oberauer, 1995) .
Thus, the process of interpreting "p only if q" starts with a direction from p to q (the first step), but in many cases it ends with the opposite direction (the second step). This can lead to different predictions for directionality effects, depending on the task context.
We assume that the directionality of the first step is critical for the present task. Consider a case in which the elements representing the p term appear first in the picture (i.e., the display order is congruent). The person can already identify the objects fulfilling the truth conditions of p and prepare for checking whether q applies for them, which is done immediately when the picture is complete. If one of the p objects does not meet the requirement that q applies to it, the trial can be answered with "no" (the prerequisite for this object being p is not met). When the picture begins with the q-term display, however, the whole process must wait until the p elements are added to begin the first step. This leads to a delay, so that the incongruent display order is responded to slower. In principle, there is no reason why, given the q-term display ftrst, the person should not start identifying the not-q objects and wait to check that none of them are p. But according to our semantic analysis of "only if" statements, this is not a natural way to process them, because the fact that q is false is only relevant in relation to p. In other words, the representation of p forms the cognitive reference frame relative to which q or not-q becomes a matter of interest (i.e., as a necessary prerequisite).
The "only if" conditional is interesting in the present context because speculated that models arising from "if... then" statements are directed fromp to q, whereas "only if" statements have an inherent directionality from q to p. In our view, the preference for backward inferences from "only if" premises noted by results from the direction of the second step of the procedure. Once a premise like "p only if q" is given together with the minor premise "not q," the standard two-step procedure of interpreting the conditional statement leads directly to the MT conclusion that p must be false. This is, of course, not the case for standard conditionals that lead the reasoner only from the antecedent to the consequent (supporting MP). Off-line measures like people's ratings of acceptability for given conclusions give only a summary picture of the whole reasoning process, which, as expected, displays more MT and less MP conclusions accepted with "only if" compared with "if... then." The sentence verification task used here offers an on-line measure of the verification process, thereby providing an opportunity to test our account of "only if" statements against .
Disjunctions of the form "p or q" (and conjunctions, "p and q") do not appear to have any inherent directionality. It would be arbitrary to designate one term as the standard reference object and the other as the target object. Presumably, people construct representations for disjunctions and conjunctions outside a discourse context by starting with one dement chosen by chance (or depending on factors unrelated to the logical relation). Therefore, we expect no inherent directionality for disjunctive statements. This is important in the present context, because tasks involving disjunctions can serve as a baseline for the measurement of contentspecific directionality effects in the other relations. The standard conditional "ifp then q," the variant "p only if q," and the inclusive disjunction ("p or q or both") were used in Experiment 3a. There were also sentences with the quantifier "all," equivalent to those in Experiment 2, to provide a direct comparison with the quantifier that is logically related to the standard conditional "if p then q." Experiment 3b added tasks with biconditionals, reversed conditionals, and the exclusive disjunction ("either p or q but not both"). The two sets of propositional relations were presented to different participants because it has been observed that people tend to confuse inclusive with exclusive disjunction as well as standard conditionals with biconditionals (e.g., Klauer & Oberauer, 1995) , and this might be even more the case when both forms are presented intermixed within the same experiment. We expected reaction time advantages for congruent displays in cases of the standard conditional, the quantifier "all," the "only if" form, and perhaps for the biconditional. The reverse conditional, "p if q," should yield faster reactions to incongruent displays. Reaction times should not differ for both kinds of disjunctions (see Table 1 ).
Method
Participants. Students from the University of Matmhdm were recruited for both experiments; they received course credit or 10 DM (about $7) for their participation. There were 41 participants in Experiment 3a (16 men and 25 women; mean age = 24.0 years, SD = 4.6) and 29 participants in Experiment 3b (16 men and 13 women; mean age = 21.8 years, SD = 2.1).
Materials and procedure. Design and procedure of the two experiments were exactly like in Experiment 2, with the following exceptions. The materials consisted of sentences with four propositional relations in Experiment 3a: (a) "If the object is a triangle, then it contains a four," (b) "All triangles contain a four," (c) "The object is a triangle only if it contains a four," and (d) "The object is a triangle or it contains a four," together with the respective counterparts with numbers as the p terms and geometrical figures as the q terms. The disjunctive statement was explained in the written instructions as meaning the inclusive "or." Experiment 3b displayed sentences of three kinds: (a) "The object is a triangle if it contains a four," (b) "If and only if the object is a triangle, then it contains a four," and (c) "The object is either a triangle, or it contains a four." The disjunctive statement was explained as having an exclusive meaning.
Different from Experiment 2, the number of p objects, as opposed to not-p elements, was not varied systematically. Care was taken, however, that at least one instance of thep and the q category appeared in the picture, except for "false" trials of "if-then," "only if," and "all," where sometimes no q was present, and "false" trials of inclusive or, where pictures with neither p nor q could be presented on some occasions (depending on the picture elements generated at random from trial to trial). 4
Resul~ Experiment 3a.
Reaction time data were treated as in the previous experiments. A repeated measures 4 (relation) x 2 (sentence order) x 2 (congruence) ANOVA was performed on verification times of Experiment 3a. There were significant main effects ofaU three factors, with F(3, 120) = 20.15, MSE = 0.09 for relation; F(1, 40) = 10.73, MSE = 0.06 for sentence order; and F(1, 40) = 36.96, MSE = 0.08 for congruence. Disjunctive sentences took longer to be verified than the other three logical connectives (see Figure 3 , top). Sentences with the geometrical figure mentioned first were verified faster. Pictures congruent with sentence order were responded to faster than those with incongruent display order. These effects were qualified by a Congruence X Relation interaction, F(3, 120) = 7.07, MSE = 0.05, and a Congrnence x Sentence Order interaction, F(1, 40) = 15.20, MSE = 0.06. As expected, effects of congruence were observed for the two conditionals and the quantifier "all" but not for the disjunction. Congruence had a larger effect on sentences in which the geometrical figure was mentioned first than when numbers were mentioned first. This replicates the directionality effect of the containment relations embedded within the propositional connectives, as observed in Experiment 2 with quantifiers. No other effects became significant. The pattern of results is illustrated in Figure 3 (top).
Separate 2 × 2 ANOVAs for the four relations confirmed highly significant congruence effects for the quantifier "all," F(1, 40) = 34.64, MSE = 0.05; for the standard conditional, F(1, 40) = 25.91, MSE = 0.06; and for the "only if" form, F(I, 40) = 11.12, MSE = 0.07, but not for the disjunction (F < 1).
Accuracy data were analyzed by a 4 x 2 × 2 ANOVA parallel to the reaction time analysis to guard against speed-accuracy tradeoff. The only significant effect was one of congruence, F(1, 40) = 18.30, MSE = 0.15, indicating that responses were more accurate in the congruent condition, and there was a Relation x Sentence Order interaction, F(3, 120) = 4.47, MSE = 0.10, due to the standard conditional, which was verified better with sentence order figure-number. No indications for a systematic speedaccuracy tradeoff were found. Experiment 3b. The verification times from Experiment 3b were analyzed by a 3 (relation) × 2 (sentence order) × 2 (congruence) ANOVA. Significant main effects of all three factors emerged, F(2, 56) = 8.92, MSE = 0.14 for the kind of relation; F(1, 28) = 5.31, MSE = 0.15 for sentence order; and F(1, 28) = 31.12, MSE = 0.02 for congruence. In addition, there was a significant Relation × Congruence interaction, F(2, 56) = 7.05, MSE = 0.05. Separate 2 × 2 ANOVAs for the three relations revealed a significant effect of congruence for the reversed conditional, F(7, 28) = 22.37, MSE = 0.05, but none for the biconditional (F < 1) and for the exclusive disjunction, F(1, 28) = 2.82, MSE = 0.03. As can be seen in the bottom panel of Figure 3 , the incongruent displays are verified faster for the reversed conditional.
Accuracy data again mirrored the picture from the verification time analysis. There was a strong main effect of relation, F(2, 56) = 59.66, MSE = 0.14, indicating that more errors were made with the reversed conditional (74% correct) than with the other two relations (95% for bicondifional, 94% for exclusive disjunction). The main effect of congruence also became significant, F(1, 28) = 14.48, MSE = 0.06. The interaction of congruence with kind of relation was not significant (F < 2). Separate analyses for the three relations showed a highly significant effect of congruence for the reversed conditional, F(1, 28) = 7.36, MSE = 0.14; no effect for the biconditional (F < 1); and a marginally significant congruence effect for the disjunction, F(1, 28) = 3.69, MSE = 0.06, p = .07.
Discussion
The directionality effects observed for the propositional connectives were in accordance with the predictions from the referencetarget account. The standard conditional and the "only if" form showed directionality from the p term to the q term, as did the sentences with "all." The directionality was reversed for the reversed conditional. This shows that the effect is due to the antecedent-consequent structure expressed by a conditional premise, not to superficial features such as order of terms in the sentence. As predicted, no consistent effect of directionality was observed for the two variants of disjunction. The biconditional statements also yielded no directionality effect. This is consistent with an interpretation of biconditionals as "ifp then q and if q then p," resulting in two opposing directionality effects that cancel out each other. Contrary to a hypothesis proposed by , directionality effects were not reversed for "only if" sentences relative to standard conditionals. The tendency of reasoners to prefer inferences from q to p when the premise is "p only if q," as observed by Evans, apparently does not reflect a simple backward directionality of this connective. The complex pattern of directionality effects for "only if" can be explained by the two-step procedure we suggested above to capture its meaning. A statement of the form "p only if q" instructs a person first to look for cases of p. When p is found to be true, one has to check whether its precondition q is also true. If this is not the case, one has to focus back on p and conclude that it is false, or else that the conditional is false. This two-step procedure begins with a shift of attention from p to q, eventually followed by a mental movement back to p. In the present experiment, in which the initialization of the verification process is critical for response latency, the directionality of the first part will determine the effect. However, the second part of the process will support backward conclusions from "only if" premises, in accordance with the data in .
General Discussion
Taken together, the present experiments show that relational premises in various domains of reasoning have inherent directionality. We operationalized directionality as a preferential order of processing the two terms in a sentence-picture verification task. Some relations showed directionality from the first to the second term, others from the second to the first term, and still others showed none at all. The pattern of directionality effects over the relations tested matches the generalization that there is a preference to process the term referring to a reference object before the term referring to a target object. Depending on the relation involved, the object or situation that a statement suggests as the reference frame for a relational representation is one the hearer is supposed to know (e.g., left-right relations), one that is supposed to be established by previous discourse (e.g., the subjects of quantifiers or the consequent of "only if" statements), or one the speaker asks the hearer to presuppose (e.g., in the case of standard conditionals).
Correlated Concepts and Alternative Interpretations
The contrast between reference object and target object is related to linguistic concepts such as the distinction between topic and comment and the given-new structure of sentences (Chafe, 1976; Greenspan & Segal, 1984; Haviland & Clark, 1974) . Unfortunately, these concepts are used with different meaning by different authors (for an overview, see Prince, 1981) . Sometimes "given" information is def'med as what the hearer is supposed to know already (e.g., Haviland & Clark, 1974) , sometimes it is defined as information assumed to be salient in the hearer's consciousness (Chafe, 1976) . "Topic" and "comment" are sometimes identified with "given" versus "new" (Hornby, 1972; L~Stscher, 1992) , whereas others distinguish the two contrasts (Chafe, 1976) .
The distinction of reference object and target object can be expected to correlate both with a speaker's assumption about what the hearer already knows ("given" in the sense of Haviland & Clark, 1974) and with what has been introduced in previous discourse ("given" in the sense of Chafe, 1976) , because speakers will tend to formulate relational statements in a way that supports smooth comprehension. An object already known by the hearer, as well as an object already introduced in previous discourse, is a natural reference object for a new relation expressed by a statement, because the new relation can be immediately integrated into the world knowledge or the discourse representation of the hearer. Therefore, statements that package the reference object as "given" and/or as "topic" and the target object as "new" and/or "comment" will often sound more natural (and be easier to comprehend) than statements that use the reverse information packaging. Because the cognitive system seems to have a preference for processing the reference object first, it is not surprising that "given" and "topic" information are usually mentioned early in a sentence.
There are cases, however, in which two principles guiding the allocation of reference and target object to information structure come into conflict with each other: When a stranger asks, "Please, where is the church?" and a local answers: "The church is on the left of the train station," it is the church that is introduced as a discourse topic, but it is the location of the train station that the stranger is assumed to know. In this case, the reference object (i.e., the train station) is mentioned as the second term in the statement, leaving the first position to the discourse topic. Experiment 1 has shown that directionality is driven by the relation of reference and target object and not by the topic-comment contrast as defined by Greenspan and Segal (1984) .
The contrast of reference and target object is correlated with syntactic factors as well. The term referring to a reference object or reference frame frequently corresponds to the subject noun phrase, and this is often the first noun phrase of the sentence. Again, evidence from Experiment 1 shows that the grammatical role and the position of noun phrases in a sentence are not critical. In "The circle contains the triangle," the circle is the subject, whereas it is the object in "The triangle is contained in the circle." Nonetheless, in both cases the circle builds the reference frame. The comparison of standard and reversed conditionals in Experiments 3a and 3b also showed that the order of terms in a statement is not the critical factor.
In some cases, the directionality of the relation in a statement is confounded with a logical asymmetry. For example, standard conditionals of the form "if p, then q" are not equivalent to a statement in which reference and target object are simply reversed to "if q, then p." In these cases, it might be argued, directionality arises from the logical meaning of the connective alone. Logical asymmetry, however, is not an issue for the left-right relations in Experiment 1 and for the quantifiers "some" and "no" in Experiment 2. In each of these cases, the same relation could be expressed in two forms that differ in which term refers to the reference object and which to the target object but are logically equivalent (e.g., "The cross is on the left of the triangle" and "The triangle is on the right of the cross"). Nonetheless, we found directionality effects for these relations as well. The most parsimonious explanation is that directionality effects arise from factors that do not depend on logical asymmetries in the relations.
Potential Implications for Reasoning
We suggested that the inherent directionality of relational premises can influence the reasoning process, resulting in effects of term order or premise order. One possible application of this idea is the figural effect in syllogistic reasoning. The directionality of quantified statements can explain at least in part the preference for a specific order of terms in conclusions. If people tend to preserve the role of terms as referring to reference or target object, it follows directly that the figure A-B , B-C will yield mainly A-C conclusions and rarely conclusions with the order C-A, because the former keeps the A term in the role of the reference object and the C term in the role of the target. An analogous argument has been put forward by Hardman and Payne (1995) based on the contrast of topic and comment, which is perfectly correlated with the contrast of reference and target objects in the case of quantifiers, because the subject of a quantified statement is both the topic (i.e., what the sentence is about) and the term referring to the reference object. Likewise, Polk and Newell (1995) presented an analogous explanation for figural effects in syllogisms based on the distinction between identifying properties and secondary properties. Identifying properties are properties used to identify the individual or individuals a statement is about (i.e., the topic); secondary properties are properties attributed to these individuals by the statement (i.e., the comment). The account proposed here is in agreement with both these proposals with respect to figural effects in syllogisms, but its domain of application is more general. As we have seen in Experiment 1, the contrast of reference and target object deviates from the topic-comment contrast in case of some spatial relations, and the directionality of single premises seems to follow the contrast of reference and target object.
In any case, the inherent directionality of quantified premises will most likely not be the only factor contributing to figural effects in syllogisms. As Stenning and Yule (1997) noted, there are more valid A-C conclusions among the syllogisms with figure  A-B , B-C and more valid C-A conclusions among those with figure B-A, C-B; so a perfect reasoner will produce one aspect of the figural effect regardless of how she or he processes the premises. The figural effect, however, can also be observed in the erroneous conclusions people draw for syllogisms with no valid conclusions (Johnson-Laird & Bara, 1984) , so there must be some factor beyond the distribution of valid syllogisms that affects the order of terms in conclusions. The inherent directionality of relational statements can be one such factor.
The connection to directionality effects observed in deductive reasoning tasks is not so easily drawn in the domain of propositional reasoning. The preference for backward conclusions from "p only if q" premises as observed by does not fit the directionality effect obtained here with "only if" statements. We proposed an explanation for the diverging results, but this must remain speculative until more direct evidence is available. The figural effect with disjunctive premises (Bauer & Johnson-Laird, 1993 ) also does not match the results on directionality effects obtained in the present experiments. At present, we have no good explanation for this discrepancy.
The evidence for directionality effects in spatial reasoning (De Vooght & Vandierendonck, 1998 ) is fully consistent with the pattern of results obtained in Experiment 1. Two consecutive premises with the figure A-B/C-B yielded shorter latencies for reading of the second premise than a pair in the figure B-A/B-C. This is what can be expected with premises in which the second term refers to the reference object. A pair of premises using the same reference object will be easier to integrate because the interpretation of the second premise can start with a reference object already established in the semantic representation of the fwst premise.
We conclude that the inherent directionality of relational premises is a factor that potentially has an effect on the reasoning from these premises. If this is true, we can expect effects of directionality on reasoning in all domains of deduction. The integration of two or more premises in a deductive argument is a special kind of minldiscourse, and the reference-target structure of the sentences involved can be expected to affect its degree of coherence. This, in turn, will most likely affect the smoothness of comprehension and, therefore, the latency of deriving a conclusion; in addition, there should be effects on reasoning accuracy as well. As far as we see, this is as yet largely uncharted territory in the research on deductive reasoning that deserves more attention in the future.
